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Introduction
State income tax statutes define residency and provide the
rules for taxation of a state resident.
In most states,
maintenance of a domicile in the state is sufficient, by itself, for
taxation as a resident without regard to any other test.
Unfortunately, rather than applying a set of easily measurable
objective tests to meet this domicile standard, the state taxing
authorities instead simply think they know it when they see it.
Unfortunately, they do not and neither do taxpayers. Such an
attitude is reminiscent of the concurring opinion of Justice
Potter Stewart, who, when struggling with the definition of
obscenity gave us the famous quote: ”I know it when I see it.”1
While this type of judicial reasoning may be entirely appropriate
in obscenity disputes, state definitions of “resident” for personal
income tax purposes need not and should not resort to similar
subjective standards.
The current domicile standard often requires a look into
the intent of the taxpayer when determining domicile and the
resulting tax liability.2 Better options exist for an important
standard crucial to the proper computation of tax liability and
the integrity and administration of our state individual income
tax systems. The current domicile standard has resulted in
1. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
2. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 1(f) (2018); MINN. STAT. § 290.01(7)
(2018); N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(b) (McKinney 2019).
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uncertain, inconsistent, time-consuming, and invasive audits.
The time has come to end these corrosive we-know-it-when-wesee-it audits that have eroded the confidence of taxpayers and
created inefficiencies in tax administration. States should
reconsider their laws in furtherance of sound tax policy.
This Article argues that states should remove the domicile
concept from the definition of a resident and rely solely on an
objective test or tests. Part I of this Article defines the terms
resident and domicile using examples from the laws of
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New York. Part II discusses the
problems created for individuals and state taxing authorities in
the application of a subjective standard, the burden and
standard of proof applied, and the domicile or residency bias of
states. Part III describes how Congress defines a resident of the
United States and the rationale behind Congress’s movement
away from its previous subjective standard. Using tax policy
maxims, Part IV concludes by supporting a shift away from the
current use of the subjective domicile standard and a
modification of state tax laws to more closely follow the federal
income tax definition of a resident.
I. Current Law in Many States
The laws of Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New York,
described in this Part of the Article, illustrate the importance of
the residency determination, provide the definitions of resident
and domicile, and demonstrate state efforts to demystify the
definition of domicile using objective factors. This Article will
use these three states to illustrate the difficulties associated
with the domicile test for residency.
A.

Why Residency Matters

Forty-three states impose a personal income tax.3 Fortyone states tax most income earned by an individual.4 Two states,
3. Morgan Scarboro, State Individual Income Tax Rates and Brackets for
2018, TAX FOUND. (Mar. 5, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/state-individualincome-tax-rates-brackets-2018/.
4. Id.
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New Hampshire and Tennessee, limit their personal income tax
to dividend and interest income.5 In determining its tax base, a
state may constitutionally tax the worldwide income of a state
resident.6 However, the U.S. Constitution limits the taxation of
nonresidents to income sourced to that particular state.7 In
compliance with this constitutional mandate, states have
drafted statutes and regulations defining nonresident source
income that falls within the permissible tax base.
Massachusetts imposes tax on a nonresident’s income
derived from or effectively connected with:
(1) [A]ny trade or business, including any
employment, carried on by [the taxpayer] in
Massachusetts . . .
(2) [T]he participation in any lottery or wagering
transaction in Massachusetts; or
(3) [T]he ownership of any interest in real or
tangible personal property located in
Massachusetts.8
In Minnesota, nonresident individuals initially compute
their taxable income the same way that residents do.9 After
applying the rate to get a tax liability, and subtracting
nonrefundable credits, nonresidents apportion the tax itself
according to the ratio that Minnesota-source federal adjusted
gross income bears to total federal adjusted gross income.10 In
the calculation of the numerator of its fraction, the state
definition of Minnesota–source federal adjusted gross income
includes:


Wages, salaries, fees, commissions, tips or
bonuses for work done in Minnesota

5. Id.
6. See generally New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37,
57 (1920).
8. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 5A (2018); 830 MASS. CODE REGS. 62.5A.1(2)
(2018).
9. MINN. STAT. § 290.06 subdiv. 2c(e) (2018).
10. § 290.06 subdiv. 2c(e)(1) .
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Gross winnings from gambling in Minnesota
Gross rents and royalties from Minnesota
property
Gains from the sale of land or other tangible
property in Minnesota
Gains from the sale of a partnership interest
that had property or sales in Minnesota
Gains on the sale of goodwill or income from a
“non-compete” agreement connected with a
business operating in Minnesota
Minnesota gross income from a business or
profession conducted partly or entirely in
Minnesota, including any Minnesota gross
income received as a shareholder of an S
corporation or as a partner of a partnership11

Similar to Minnesota law, New York law requires that
nonresidents compute their tax as if they were residents and
then prorate the tax based on the ratio of New
York source income to all income.12 In the calculation of the
numerator of its fraction, the state definition of New York-source
income includes:








[R]eal or tangible personal property located in
New York State, (including certain gains or
losses from the sale or exchange of an interest
in an entity that owns real property in New
York State . . . ;
[S]ervices performed in New York State;
[A] business, trade, profession, or occupation
carried on in New York State;
[D]istributive share of New York State
partnership income or gain;
New York State estate or trust income or gain;
New York State Lottery winnings if the total

11. MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, INCOME TAX FACT SHEET 3: NONRESIDENTS
(2018), https://www.revenue.state.mn.us/individuals/individ_income/factsheet
s/fact_sheets_fs3.pdf.
12. N.Y. TAX LAW § 601(e) (McKinney 2019).
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proceeds of the prize are more than $5,000 . . .;
[A]ny gain from the sale, transfer, or other
disposition of shares of stock in a cooperative
housing corporation in connection with the
grant or transfer of a proprietary leasehold,
when the real property comprising the units of
the cooperative housing corporation is located
in New York State;
[A]ny income . . . received related to a
business, trade, profession, or occupation
previously carried on in New York State,
including but not limited to covenants not to
compete and termination agreements . . . ; and
[Income from] a New York S corporation in
which you are a shareholder, including:
 [A]ny gain recognized on the receipt of
payments
from
an
installment
obligation for federal income tax
purposes where the S corporation has
distributed an installment obligation
under IRC section 453(h)(1)(A) to the
shareholders;
 [A]ny gain recognized on the deemed
asset sale for federal income tax
purposes where the S corporation has
made an election under IRC section
338(h)(10); and
 [A]ny income or gain recognized on the
receipt of payments from an installment
sale contract entered into when the S
corporation was subject to tax in
New York in a case where the S
corporation terminates its taxable
status in New York.13

13. N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF TAX’N AND FIN., NEW YORK SOURCE INCOME OF
NONRESIDENT INDIVIDUALS, ESTATES, AND TRUSTS, AND PART-YEAR RESIDENT
INDIVIDUALS AND TRUSTS 1 (2011), https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/tg_bulletins/pit/
b11_615i.pdf.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8

6

ARTICLE 8_THOMAS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

DOMICILE IN MULTISTATE

8/23/2019 6:45 PM

881

Although these states apply different formulae for reaching
the tax base of nonresidents, each state attempts to limit the
taxation of nonresidents to income earned within its borders.
Because a residency determination results in the imposition of
tax on worldwide income, such a determination substantially
broadens the tax base of resident individuals that have earned
income within and without their resident jurisdiction.
B.

When Residency Disputes Arise

Residency disputes often arise when taxpayers move into
or out of a state and the taxpayer disagrees with the government
with respect to residency status. Between 1989 and 1998, New
York conducted over 30,000 residency audits and assessments
from these New York residency audits exceeded $1 billion.14
When things go well and no dispute arises, the residency
state taxes the worldwide income of the resident and grants a
credit to the taxpayer for taxes paid on income sourced to the
nonresident state.15 This credit often avoids or substantially
reduces the taxation of the same income in the resident and
nonresident state.
Occasionally, where a taxpayer meets the residency test of
two states with a personal income tax, the situation becomes
more complicated. Although we may hope for a constitutional
limitation on state taxation in this situation, the U.S. Supreme
Court has upheld the taxation by two or more states as residents
in the estate tax context and the logic would likely apply in the
income tax area.16
Fortunately, when two states claim
residency, that individual generally finds relief through the
credit mechanism described above that grants a credit for taxes
paid to the other state. Similar to the credit granted residents
for tax paid to nonresident jurisdictions, the credit mechanism

14. Paul R. Comeau & Andrew B. Sabol, Multistate Residency Issues:
Might Regional Uniformity Be Applied Nationwide?, 7 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N &
INCENTIVES 272, 273 (1998).
15. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 6(a) (2018); MINN. STAT. § 290.06
subdiv. 22a (2018); N.Y. TAX LAW § 620(a) (McKinney 2019).
16. See generally Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982); Worcester Cty. Trust
Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292 (1937).
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often eliminates a duplication of tax on the same income.17
A move from a taxing state to a state with no personal
income tax often produces a large tax disparity and may receive
more attention from the states. The former resident state would
like to continue to tax the individual as a resident giving that
state access to a tax base that includes the individual’s
worldwide income. Successful abandonment of residency in the
former state of residence, assuming no income sourced to the
former resident state, leaves the former resident state with no
tax base. Therefore, establishing a residency change from a
taxing state to a state with no personal income tax can eliminate
state personal income tax in its entirety. Because Florida is both
a retirement destination and a state with no personal income
tax,18 retirees headed for Florida from states with a personal
income tax provide an excellent illustration of the tax at stake.
To quantify the amount at stake in a move to a no-tax
state,19 a taxpayer can estimate the savings by multiplying the
former residence state’s taxable income by the marginal rate in
that state. Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New York have tax
rates of 5.1 percent,20 9.85 percent,21 and 8.82 percent,22
respectively.23 Due to their higher tax rates, high-tax states,
including the three States discussed in this Article, face greater
revenue pressures due to the migration of individuals from
higher-tax to lower-tax states. A Cato Institute study concluded
that tax rates influence interstate migration flows.24 In 2016,
17. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Apportioning State Personal Income Taxes
to Eliminate the Double Taxation of Dual Residents: Thoughts Provoked by the
Proposed Minnesota Snowbird Tax, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 533 (2014) (discussing
the credit mechanism and when that mechanism does not work perfectly for
dual resident taxpayers).
18. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5 (prohibiting a personal income tax).
19. Assuming no income sourced to the former residence jurisdiction.
20. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 4(a) (2018).
21. MINN. STAT. § 290.06 subdiv. 2c (2018) (2019 highest marginal tax
rate).
22. N.Y. TAX LAW § 601(a)(1)(B)(ii) (McKinney 2019) (2019 highest
marginal tax rate).
23. See Jason Notte, How Much Can You Save by Moving to a Low-Tax
State?, ST. (Mar. 28, 2018, 9:37 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/1452322
2/1/how-much-can-you-save-by-moving-to-a-low-tax-state.html
(discussing
calculation of savings from move to a no-tax state).
24. CHRIS EDWARDS, TAX & BUDGET BULLETIN: TAX REFORM AND
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almost 600,000 people with aggregate income of $33 billion
moved, on net, from the twenty-five highest-tax states to the
twenty-five lowest-tax states in that single year.25 Of the
twenty-five highest-tax states, twenty-four of them had net outmigration in 2016.26 Of the twenty-five lowest-tax states,
seventeen had net in-migration.27 The largest out-migration is
from high-tax New York, whereas the largest in-migration is to
low-tax Florida.28 Due to the guidance provided by various
popular internet resources, the migration to Florida may not
surprise many. Potentially accelerating the move to Florida,
numerous tax professionals have advertised their expertise in
domicile changes to low-tax states.29
The states seem to have noticed this migration and the
publicity surrounding the migration. Although states do not
publish their targeting methodology for residency examinations,
there are a wealth of examples from practitioners who have
noted that Departments of Revenue seem to have an abundance
of Florida retiree audits.30 These retirees can become
particularly attractive audit targets when they recognize a large
capital gain after their purported change of residency. If the
states succeed in classifying these taxpayers as residents in the
year of capital gain recognition, it may tax their entire gain.31 In
the absence of a successful residency claim, Massachusetts,
INTERSTATE MIGRATION 1 (Sept. 6, 2018), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/fi
les/pubs/pdf/tbb-84-revised.pdf.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Sandra Block, et al., 10 Most Tax-Friendly States for Retirees,
2018, KIPLINGER (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.kiplinger.com/slidesho
w/retirement/T037-S001-10-most-tax-friendly-states-for-retirees-2018/index.h
tml; Patrick Kiger, Which States Provide the Best Tax Breaks for Retirees?,
AARP (June 5, 2017), https://www.aarp.org/money/taxes/info-2017/states-besttax-breaks-retirees-fd.html.
30. See, e.g., John H. Gadon, et al., Home is Where the House is—or is It?,
PRACTICAL TAX LAWYER, Spring 2012, at 12; Susan B. Garland, States
Targeting Snowbirds Fleeing to Tax-Friendlier Climates, KIPLINGER (Feb.
2016), https://kiplinger.com/article/retirement/T055-C000-S004-home-is-wher
e-the-tax-haven-is.html.
31. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 4(a) (2018); MINN. STAT. § 290.014
subdiv. 1; N.Y. TAX LAW § 601 (McKinney 2019).
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Minnesota, and New York nonresidents escape taxation on gains
from the sale or exchange of intangibles not derived from or
effectively connected with the carrying on of a trade or business
in the state.32
Therefore, residents of the three states
recognizing large capital gains from intangible sales avoid tax if
they successfully abandon their residency in the taxing state for
a state without a personal income tax. In its instructions to its
auditors, New York announced its intent to target individuals
with large capital gain recognition shortly after their residency
change.33 Therefore, to properly file and plan for state personal
income tax liabilities, taxpayers must understand the varying
definitions of domicile and resident.
C.

Definition of Resident

As stated above, state income tax statutes provide the
definition of a resident and the consequences of that
determination. Despite the utilization of different tests for
determining residency status, domicile in the state results in
taxation as a resident, without regard to any other test, in most
states and the District of Columbia.
When defining a “resident,” many states follow a rule
similar to that of Massachusetts. Massachusetts defines a
“resident” for tax purposes in the following manner:
(1) [A]ny natural person domiciled in the
commonwealth, or (2) any natural person who is
not domiciled in the commonwealth but who
maintains a permanent place of abode in the
commonwealth and spends in the aggregate more
than one hundred eighty-three days of the taxable
year in the commonwealth, including days spent

32. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 5A(a) (2018); MINN. STAT. § 290.17(2)(c)
(2018); N.Y. TAX LAW § 631(b)(2) (McKinney 2019).
33. STATE OF N.Y. DEP’T OF TAX’N AND FIN., NONRESIDENT AUDIT
GUIDELINES 84 (2014), https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/2014/misc/nonresident_audi
t_guidelines_2014.pdf (directing the department’s auditors to pay special
attention to taxpayers who recognize large capital gains “immediately” after a
reported change of domicile).
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partially in and
commonwealth.34

partially

out

of

the

In Minnesota, the term “resident” includes any individual
domiciled in Minnesota and any individual domiciled outside the
state who maintains a place of abode in the state and spends in
the aggregate more than one-half of the tax year in Minnesota. 35
Similarly, New York defines a resident as one who:
(A) [I]s domiciled in [New York]; or (B) is not
domiciled in [New York] but maintains a
permanent place of abode in this state and spends
in the aggregate more than one hundred eightythree days of the taxable year in this state, unless
such individual is in active service in the armed
forces of the United States.36
Like many other states with a personal income tax,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New York have another
opportunity to catch taxpayers in their residency webs by
finding residency based on a mere count of days present in the
taxing state.37 Although the states vary the number of days of
presence required, most states treat 183 days as sufficient for
residency.38 Of the states employing this alternative test, many
also require that the taxpayer have a permanent place of abode
in the state.39 Rooted in an objective count of days, this “days
test” rarely creates the taxpayer angst that often follows a
subjective domicile determination, and the states find it easier
to enforce.40 For that reason, this Article focuses on the domicile
34. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 1(f) (2018).
35. MINN. STAT. § 290.01 subdiv. 7 (2018).
36. N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(b) (McKinney 2019).
37. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 1(f) (2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.01
subdiv. 7(b) (2018); N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(b)(1)(A) (McKinney 2019).
38.
MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, RESIDENCY REPORT 6–8 (2015),
https://www.revenue.state.mn.us/research_stats/Documents/Residency_Repor
t_03_13_15.pdf.
39. Id.
40. Edward A. Zelinsky, Defining Residence for Income Tax Purposes:
Domicile as Gap-Filler, Citizenship as Proxy and Gap-Filler, 38 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 271 (2017).
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test employed by the states and argues for its removal from the
definition of resident. Instead, the “days test,” or a modified
version of that test, would constitute an appropriate
replacement for the domicile standard.
D.

Definition of Domicile
1.

History of the Law of Domicile

The word “domicile,” derived from the Latin domus
meaning a home or dwelling place, dates back to the Roman
Empire.41 Roman law recognized a connection between a person
and her community known as domicile.42 Under Roman law, an
individual could acquire and abandon a domicile provided that
individual had an intention to do so and accompanied that
intention with presence.43
English common law addressed the definition of domicile
as early as 1820 in Munroe v. Douglas.44 The Court declared,
“[a]n acquired domicil is not lost by mere abandonment, but
continues until a subsequent domicil is acquired . . .”45 Later, in
Udny v. Udny, Lord Westbury further defined domicile:
Domicil of choice is a conclusion or inference
which the law derives from the fact of a man fixing
voluntarily his sole or chief residence in a
particular place, with an intention of continuing
to reside there for an unlimited time. This is a
description of the circumstances which create or
constitute a domicil, and not a definition of the
term. There must be a residence freely chosen,
and not prescribed or dictated by any external
necessity, such as the duties of office, the demands
of creditors, or the relief from illness; and it must
be residence fixed not for a limited period or
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

25 AM. JUR. 2D Domicil § 1 (2012); 28 C.J.S. Domicile § 3 (2004).
M.W. JACOBS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMICIL 3, 7–11 (1887).
Id. at 7.
Munroe v. Douglas (1820) 56 Eng. Rep 940.
Id.
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particular purpose, but general and indefinite in
its future contemplation.46
In 1853, a state law case reached the U.S. in Dupuy v.
Wurtz.47 There, the New York Court of Appeals faced questions
concerning the validity of a will made by a testatrix, originally
domiciled in New York.48 She went abroad in 1859 for health
reasons and remained abroad until her death in 1871.49 In
deciding that the testatrix had retained a New York domicile,
the court established early U.S. concepts of domicile. The Court
opined that every person must have a domicile, can have but one
domicile, and that domicile continues until a new one is
acquired.50 In addition, a change of domicile required not only a
change of residence, but also an intention to abandon the former
domicile and acquire another as the sole domicile.51
Matter of Newcomb presented the New York courts with
another interesting domicile issue.52 After reaching the age of
eighty, Mrs. Newcomb, a domiciliary of New York, decided to
move to New Orleans where she had established a memorial
monument for her daughter.53 In anticipation of a domicile
question, she executed several formal declarations, in one of
which she said:
I have now concluded to make my permanent
home here, because on each succeeding day of my
life now drawing to a close, I am the grateful
witness of the successful development and steady
growth of this noble institution (referring to the
Memorial College), which now engrosses my
thoughts and purposes and is endeared to me by
such hallowed associations. In order that there
may be no occasion for misapprehension
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Udny v. Udny (1869) 1 Sc. & Div. 441, 458 (Scot.).
53 N.Y. 556 (1873).
Id.
Id. at 558.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 561; 25 AM. JUR. 2D Domicil § 1 (2012).
See generally In re Estate of Newcomb, 84 N.E. 950 (N.Y. 1908).
Id. at 952–53.
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hereafter, especially in any matter touching the
settlement of my estate, I desire to have it known
by my particular friends that I have elected to
make the city of New Orleans my place of domicile
and permanent home, although of course I may
occasionally visit or reside in other places.54
The Court held such declarations admissible as evidence of
her intent as to domicile.55 It also noted “a person may have two
places of residence, as in the city and country, but only one
domicile.”56 Echoing the definitions of domicile discussed above,
the Court defined domicile as “living in that locality with the
intent to make it a fixed and permanent home.”57 The Court
ultimately found for the taxpayer and her intent to establish a
domicile in New Orleans.58 A review of the days spent in New
York City and New Orleans leads readers to believe that the
Court must have placed great weight on her declaration of
domicile. Between the date of the declaration and her date of
death, she spent less than 150 days in New Orleans and more
than 500 in New York City.59
In 1914, a domicile case reached the U.S. Supreme Court
in Williamson v. Osenton.60 There, the Plaintiff moved from
West Virginia to Virginia and brought a suit in Virginia for
divorce.61 The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff’s jurisdiction
remained in West Virginia (the same as Defendant), thus the
requisite diversity of citizenship did not exist.62 In finding for
the Plaintiff, the Court relied on a stipulation of facts that the
Plaintiff went to Virginia “with the intention of making her
home in that state for an indefinite time in order that she might
institute this suit against the defendant in the United States

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 953.
Id. at 955.
Id. at 954.
Id.
In re Estate of Newcomb, 84 N.E. at 954.
Id. at 953.
See generally 232 U.S. 619 (1914).
Id. at 623.
Id.
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court.”63 Justice Holmes defined domicile as “. . . the technically
pre-eminent headquarters that every person is compelled to
have in order that certain rights and duties that have been
attached to it by the law may be determined.”64 In resolving the
case before him, a purported change of domicile, Justice Holmes
stated, “[t]he essential fact that raises change of abode to change
of domicil is the absence of any intention to live elsewhere.”65
In 1971, the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws stated,
“[a] person’s domicil is usually the place where he has his
home.”66 Home, in turn, is “the place where a person dwells and
which is the center of his domestic, social and civil life.”67
From Roman law through the Second Restatement:
Conflict of Laws, domicile determined many of the rights and
obligations of the parties, the characterization of property, the
validity and construction of a will, the place of probate, and other
issues. In constructing their definitions of domicile for tax
purposes, states followed a similar path.
2.

Domicile in State Tax Law

As described below, state tax definitions of domicile remain
consistent with Roman law, common law, early U.S. law outside
of the tax context, and the definitions provided in the Second
Restatement.
In 1840, Massachusetts faced a tax domicile question in
Thorndike v. City of Boston.68 A Boston citizen had moved out of
the country but kept his mansion in the city anticipating his
wife’s return after his death.69 The taxpayer never intended to
move back to the city.70 Boston believed that the taxpayer, still
a domiciliary, owed poll tax and a tax on personal property.71 In
63. Id.
64. Id. at 625 (citing Bergner & Engel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus, 172 Mass.
154, 157 (1898)).
65. Williamson, 232 U.S. at 625.
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 cmt. a (AM. LAW
INST. 1971).
67. Id. § 12.
68. 42 Mass. 242 (1840).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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ruling in favor of the taxpayer, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court made the following statement about domicile:
No exact definition can be given of domicil; it
depends upon no one fact or combination of
circumstances, but from the whole taken together
it must be determined in each particular case. It
is a maxim, that every man must have a domicil
somewhere; and also that he can have but one. Of
course it follows, that his existing domicil
continues until he acquires another; and vice
versâ, by acquiring a new domicil, he relinquishes
his former one. From this view it is manifest that
very slight circumstances must often decide the
question. It depends upon the preponderance of
the evidence in favor of two or more places; and it
may often occur, that the evidence of facts tending
to establish the domicil in one place, would be
entirely conclusive, were it not for the existence of
facts and circumstances of a still more conclusive
and decisive character, which fix it, beyond
question, in another. So on the contrary, very
slight circumstances may fix one’s domicil, if not
controlled by more conclusive facts fixing it in
another place. If a seaman, without family or
property, sails from the place of his nativity,
which may be considered his domicil of origin,
although he may return only at long intervals, or
even be absent many years, yet if he does not by
some actual residence or other means acquire a
domicil elsewhere, he retains his domicil of
origin.72
In 1933, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
addressed a personal income tax matter in Commonwealth v.
Davis.73 The Plaintiff, Davis, argued that he had moved from
Massachusetts to Texas and the assertion of the personal income
72. Id. at 245–46.
73. 187 N.E. 33, 37 (Mass. 1933).
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tax violated both the Massachusetts and U.S. Constitution. 74
The Court first noted the following:
It is difficult if not impracticable to give a
definition of domicil at once accurate and
comprehensive. It commonly depends upon no
one fact or combination of circumstances but
upon all the factors disclosed in the particular
case. In general it is said to be the place of actual
residence with intention to remain permanently
or for an indefinite time and without any certain
purpose to return to a former place of abode.75
After reviewing the facts in Davis, the court made the following
finding:
The fact that he made no change in his method of
living, the relative attractiveness to him of
Brockton and Luling as places of abode, the small
amount of time spent and the meagre personal
belongings left in the latter place, and the
evidence as to his philanthropic, social and family
interests, the various reasons for the change put
forward from time to time and the very
elaborateness of his formal public announcements
on the subject, all might have been regarded as
negativing, or at least as failing to prove, a change
of domicil.76
In 1956, keeping with history, Massachusetts promulgated
personal income tax regulations that defined domicile as “the
place that is an individual’s true, fixed, and permanent home,
determined by established common law principles and the facts
and circumstances of each case.”77 More recently, in Reiersen v.
Commissioner of Revenue, the taxpayer claimed he maintained
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 38.
830 MASS. CODE REGS. 62.5A.1(2) (2018).
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a domicile in the Republic of the Philippines and earned his
entire income from sources in that country.78 The Court
determined that Reiersen had found in the Philippines, business
and social success he had not enjoyed in Massachusetts.79
Reiersen had made friends and joined clubs.80 The Court also
called his family connections “distant.”81
The Court
acknowledged his expressions of intent to establish domicile in
the Philippines and found that intent reinforced by objective
evidence offered at trial.82 The Court ruled, “the subsidiary facts
found by the board require a conclusion that Reiersen had a
present and future intent during the years in issue to make the
Philippines his home and the center of his business, social, and
civic life.”83
Minnesota’s rules similarly define domicile as:
The bodily presence of an individual person in a
place coupled with an intent to make such a place
one’s home. The domicile of any person is that
place in which that person’s habitation is fixed,
without any present intentions of removal
therefrom, and to which, whenever absent, that
person intends to return.
....
The mere intention to acquire a new domicile,
without physical removal, does not change the
status of the taxpayer, nor does the fact of
physical removal, without the intention to remain,
change the person’s status.84
An individual can have only one domicile at any particular
time and that domicile, once shown to exist, continues until the
78. 524 N.E.2d 857, 857 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988).
79. Id. at 860–61.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Reiersen, 524 N.E.2d at 861 (citing Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El
Comandante, 598 F.2d 698, 700–03 (1st Cir. 1979)); Leavitt v. Scott, 338 F.2d
749, 751 (10th Cir. 1964).
84. MINN. R. 8001.0300(2) (2019).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8

18

ARTICLE 8_THOMAS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019

8/23/2019 6:45 PM

DOMICILE IN MULTISTATE

893

taxpayer abandons that domicile.85 “An absence of intention to
abandon a domicile is equivalent to an intention to retain the
existing one.”86
In Larson v. Commissioner,87 the taxpayer:
[O]wned more property in Minnesota than he did
in Nevada, spent more time in Minnesota than he
did in Nevada, registered more vehicles in
Minnesota than Nevada, and maintained bank
accounts and mail delivery in Minnesota.
Larson also maintained other personal and
professional connections in Minnesota that he did
not have in Nevada.88
Larson used attorneys, accountants, and personal assistants in
both jurisdictions during the tax years.89 Larson did not prove
that he intended to change his domicile to Nevada. 90 The Court
not only looked at Larson’s stated intent and his actions in the
tax years, but also looked at the “acts and circumstances” of
Larson’s life thereafter to evaluate “the sincerity of [his]
announced intent.”91
New York defines domicile as “the place which an
individual intends to be such individual’s permanent home—the
place to which such individual intends to return whenever such
individual may be absent.”92 Once established, that domicile
continues until the individual in question moves to a new
location with the bona fide intention of establishing a new fixed
and permanent home.93 No change of domicile results from a
removal to a new location if the taxpayer intends to remain there
only for a limited time.94 A person can have only one domicile
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
824 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Minn. 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 333.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 105.20(d)(1) (2019).
§ 105.20(d)(2).
Id.
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and if a person has two or more homes, such person’s domicile is
the one which such person regards and uses as such person’s
permanent home.95
In 1943, the New York Court of Appeals measured an
individual’s intent to create a new domicile by considering
“whether the place of habitation is the permanent home of a
person, with the range of sentiment, feeling and permanent
association with it.”96 With regard to an alleged change of
domicile, courts have found formal declarations less persuasive
than the informal acts of an individual’s “general habit of life.” 97
Although New York auditors may focus on objective factors
to make their assessments, New York courts have found in favor
of taxpayers that provided the court with compelling testimony
as to their subjective domicile intent.98 In Matter of Patrick, the
taxpayer returned to New York to marry his long lost love from
40 years earlier, Clara.99 After experiencing some medical
issues, he separated from his wife at that time to begin his
search for Clara.100 He found Clara again in 2008.101 In 2009,
Clara and the taxpayer finalized their divorces to their spouses
and married.102 On March 1, 2011, the taxpayer retired and
joined Clara in Paris.103 The taxpayer sought permanent
residency in France, obtained a French driver’s license, and
became a world traveler with Clara.104 He purchased and
extensively renovated a Paris home and changed his lifestyle.105
Despite these changes, the taxpayer spent roughly twice as
many days in New York as he spent in Paris in both 2011 and

95. § 105.20(d)(4).
96. In re Estate of Bourne, 41 N.Y.S.2d 336, 343 (1943), aff’d, 47 N.Y.S.2d
134 (N.Y. App. Div. 1944), and aff’d, 58 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1944) (citation
omitted).
97. See, e.g., In re Trowbridge, 194 N.E. 756, 758 (N.Y. 1935).
98. See, e.g., In re Patrick, DTA Nos. 826838 and 826839 (N.Y. Div. of Tax
App. 2017).
99. Id. at 5.
100. Id. at 4.
101. Id. at 5.
102. Id. at 7.
103. Id. at 9.
104. In re Patrick, DTA Nos. 826838 and 826839, at 11.
105. Id. at 8.
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2012.106 His need for certain surgical procedure expertise in
New York, contributed to his New York presence for these two
years.107 The auditor concluded that the taxpayer’s home, active
business, family, “near and dear” items, and time spent in each
location favored a finding of New York domicile.108 The
administrative law judge found that the taxpayer’s “credible
testimony in this regard was unequivocal” and that he
“considered Paris his home.”109
In an attempt to assist taxpayers and auditors with
domicile determinations, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New
York have listed certain objective factors indicative of a
taxpayer’s subjective intent with respect to domicile.
E.

Domicile Factors

Thirty-three states use a set of factors to determine
domicile for tax purposes.110 These states use these objective
factors to ascertain the subjective intention of taxpayers with
respect to their choice of domicile.
1.

Massachusetts

In its regulations, Massachusetts defines domicile as “the
place which is an individual’s true, fixed and permanent home,
determined by established common law principles and the facts
and circumstances in each case.”111
The Massachusetts
Department of Revenue has identified the following domicile
factors on its website, under guidance entitled “Changing your
domicile,” that it believes will guide taxpayers in a
determination of whether they have changed their domicile. 112

106. Id. at 10–14.
107. Id. at 12.
108. Id. at 7. These five factors constitute New York’s primary domicile
factors, discussed in Part I, E. 3 below.
109. Id. at 21.
110. MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 38, at 6.
111. 830 MASS. CODE REGS. 62.5A.1(2) (2018).
112. Learn About Legal and Residency Status in Massachusetts, MASS.
GOV., https://www.mass.gov/service-details/learn-about-legal-and-residencystatus-in-massachusetts (last visited July 11, 2019).
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Factors that will be considered when determining if you’ve
changed your domicile:











You’ve purchased or leased a new home or an
apartment in the new location
You’ve moved his personal property to the new
location
You got permanent employment in the new
location
You canceled Massachusetts bank accounts
and opened new accounts in the new location
You sold real property in Massachusetts or
canceled leases
You issued address change notices
You changed voter registration
You got a driver’s license and automobile
registration in the new location
You changed membership in churches and
clubs
Generally, you’re involved in the new
community113

Although the Massachusetts Department of Revenue examines
each of the factors described above, Massachusetts has signed
the Northeastern States Tax Officials Association Cooperative
Agreement on Determination of Domicile requiring a focus on
the five factors described below in Part II(E)(4).
2.

Minnesota

Minnesota uses twenty-six factors to determine domicile.114
This list represents the Minnesota Department of Revenue’s
attempt to specify concrete relationships, activity, behavior, or
other actions that it believes constitutes objective evidence of an
individual intent to establish a permanent home. Because some
of the twenty-six factors overlap with one another, taxpayers
and their representatives can combine the factors into groups to
113. Id.
114. MINN R. 8001.0300 subp. 3 (2019).
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simplify the relevant concepts: employment-related factors;
homes and living arrangements; business relationships; social
and civic relationships; and other factors.
Minnesota’s twenty-six factors, or the “A-Z factors,” follow:
Considerations. The following items listed will be
considered in determining whether or not a
person is domiciled in this state:
 [L]ocation of domicile for prior years;
 [W]here the person votes or is registered to
vote, but casting an illegal vote does not
establish domicile for income tax purposes;
 [S]tatus as a student;
 [C]lassification of employment as temporary
or permanent;
 [L]ocation of employment;
 [L]ocation of newly acquired living quarters
whether owned or rented;
 [P]resent status of the former living quarters,
i.e., whether it was sold, offered for sale,
rented, or available for rent to another;
 [W]hether homestead status has been
requested and/or obtained for property tax
purposes on newly purchased living quarters
and whether the homestead status of the
former living quarters has not been renewed;
 [O]wnership of other real property;
 [J]urisdiction in which a valid driver’s license
was issued;
 [J]urisdiction from which any professional
licenses were issued;
 [L]ocation of the person’s union membership;
 [J]urisdiction from which any motor vehicle
license was issued and the actual physical
location of the vehicles;
 [W]hether resident or nonresident fishing or
hunting licenses purchased;
 [W]hether an income tax return has been filed
as a resident or nonresident;
 [W]hether the person has fulfilled the tax
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obligations required of a resident;
[L]ocation of any bank accounts, especially the
location of the most active checking account;
[L]ocation of other transactions with financial
institutions;
[L]ocation of the place of worship at which the
person is a member;
[L]ocation of business relationships and the
place where business is transacted;
[L]ocation of social, fraternal, or athletic
organizations or clubs or in a lodge or country
club, in which the person is a member;
[A]ddress where mail is received;
[P]ercentage of time (not counting hours of
employment) that the person is physically
present in Minnesota and the percentage of
time (not counting hours of employment)that
the person is physically present in each
jurisdiction other than Minnesota;
[L]ocation of jurisdiction from which
unemployment compensation benefits are
received;
[L]ocation of schools at which the person or the
person’s spouse or children attend, and
whether resident or nonresident tuition was
charged; and
[S]tatements made to an insurance company,
concerning the person’s residence, and on
which the insurance is based.115

Unlike Massachusetts and New York, Minnesota has not
adopted the five factors of the Northeastern States Tax Officials
Association Cooperative Agreement on the Determination of
Domicile as the most important or primary factors to be
considered in weighing the taxpayer’s domicile.116

115. Id.
116. See id.
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New York

New York divides its domicile factors into two general
categories: primary factors and other factors.117 An analysis of
the five primary factors (home, active business involvement,
time, items near and dear, and family connections) should
generally provide a basis for New York domicile before
documentation concerning the “other” factors is requested from
the taxpayer.118 The analysis of the primary factors should look
at the New York ties for the specific factor in relation to the ties
for the factor that exist in other locations.119
New York also listed the following other factors:










The address at which bank statements, bills,
financial data and correspondence concerning
other family business is primarily received.
The physical location of the safe deposit boxes
used for family records and valuables.
Location of auto, boat, and airplane
registrations as well as the individual’s
personal driver’s or operator’s license.
Where the taxpayer is registered to vote and
an analysis of the exercise of said privilege.
The auditor should not limit the review to the
general elections in November, but also
question the taxpayer’s participation in
primary or other off-season elections,
including school board and budget elections.
Possession of a Manhattan Parking Tax
exemption.
An analysis of telephone services at each
residence including the nature of the listing,
the type of service features, and the activity at
the location.
The citation in legal documents that a
particular location is to be considered the

117. STATE OF N.Y. DEP’T OF TAX’N AND FIN., supra note 33, at 14.
118. Id. at 15–33.
119. Id. at 15–34.
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individual’s place of domicile or that a
particular residence is considered to be a
primary residence. Examples would include,
but are not limited to, wills; divorce decrees or
separation agreements; applications for school
tax relief exemption (STAR); leases for rentcontrolled or rent-stabilized apartments.
Green cards indicating that an immigrant can
legally reside in the United States on a
permanent basis.120

In addition, the Guidelines list factors deemed irrelevant in
determining one’s domicile. The Guidelines call these items
“non-factors” and instruct auditors not to invest time in
exploring their impact on the domicile issue and not to accept
these as proof of domicile when received from taxpayers. 121
These non-factors include but are not limited to:






4.

The place of interment;
The location where the taxpayer’s will is
probated;
Passive interest in partnerships or small
corporations;
The mere location of bank accounts;
Contributions made to political candidates, or
causes; and
The location where the taxpayer’s individual
income tax returns are prepared and filed.122
NESTOA Agreement

On October 2, 1996, eleven states and the District of
Columbia entered into a cooperative agreement known as the
Northeastern States Tax Officials Association Cooperative
Agreement on Determination of Domicile.123 This Agreement
120.
121.
122.
123.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8

Id. at 38.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 40.
Northeastern

States

Tax

Officials

Association

Cooperative
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describes its purpose as facilitating the application of the tax
laws in a fair and consistent manner that fosters compliance,
reduces multiple taxation, increases tax revenue, and lowers the
burden on compliant taxpayers.124 More specifically, the policy
goals for the working group drafting the NESTOA Cooperative
agreement were as follows:




Individuals should only be determined to be
domiciliaries by one state for a specific period
of time;
Individuals should not pay tax on identical
income to multiple states; and
Criteria used should be as uniform as possible
to increase voluntary compliance and allow for
the easy exchange of information among the
NESTOA states.125

The states ultimately agreed on the following five most
important domicile factors for investigation in domicile disputes:
(1) size, use and relative value of dwelling places; (2) relative
time spent in each jurisdiction; (3) location of “near and dear”
items; (4) location of principal business involvement; and (5)
location of family connections.126
Where appropriate, the Agreement also discusses the
consideration of other factors: location of social and civic
activities, location of places of worship, and other indicia of
residence.127
When addressing each of the factors, the
Agreement requires a review of the following questions:
Home
What are the residences owned or rented by the taxpayer?
Where are they located? How are they used? What is the size
and value of each residence? Responses to all such questions
Agreement on Determination of Domicile, Oct. 1, 1996 [hereinafter NESTOA
Cooperative Agreement].
124. Id.
125. Id. § 1.
126. Id. § 2.
127. Id.
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shall be considered.
Time
Where and how the individual spends time during the tax
year shall be considered. Consideration shall also be given to
whether the taxpayer is retired or actively involved in a business
or profession. How much travel the individual does and the
nature of the travel shall be considered. The overall living
pattern or life style of the individual shall be examined.
Items “Near & Dear”
The location of the items or possessions that the individual
considers “near and dear” to his or her heart, of significant
sentimental value, family heirlooms, collections of valuables or
possessions that enhance the quality of one’s life style shall all
be reviewed.
Active Business Involvement
How the taxpayer earns a living, whether the taxpayer is
actively involved in any business ownerships or professions and
to what degree the individual is involved as well as how that
involvement compares to the involvement in business outside of
the state are areas that shall be examined.
Family Connections
When the first four factors are not conclusive, courts should
review where the individual’s minor children attend school and,
in certain unique and discrete situations, the residence of the
individual’s immediate family.128
The five factors represent a step forward in an effort to
clarify the definition of domicile. However, each factor has more
than one question in its body, the Agreement does not prioritize
the factors or the questions within each factor, and the
Agreement continues to permit a review of other indicia of
128. Id.
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domicile where appropriate.129 Like the domicile factors of each
state described above, the Agreement attempts to bring
certainty to the subjective intent of a taxpayer, through a review
of objective factors, by individuals unfamiliar with the
taxpayer’s true intention.
II. The Problems with the Current System
Residency determinations in states asserting the domicile
of a taxpayer are uncertain, unpredictable, and time-consuming,
which results in the inefficient administration of these laws.
These deficiencies are brought about by the application of a
subjective standard, the burden and standard of proof placed on
taxpayers, and the domicile bias of auditors conducting these
audits.
A.

Difficulties with a Subjective Standard

In the drafting of the NESTOA Cooperative Agreement,
the Northeastern States noted that “[t]he problems associated
with domicile and residency are difficult to address because of
the subjective nature of this whole area.”130 Before the drafting
of the NESTOA Cooperative Agreement, the courts in
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New York had their own
struggles with the subjective standards. Since state law
generally looks to objective factors to determine the subjective
intentions of taxpayers, taxpayers and the states have fought
over the identification of the relevant factors and the relative
weight given each factor. The following discussion reflects
judicial and administrative difficulties with a subjective
standard in Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New York.
1.

Massachusetts

As a starting point to our discussion of state difficulties
with a subjective standard, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court described the domicile standard as follows:
129. NESTOA Cooperative Agreement, supra note 123.
130. Id.
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No exact definition can be given of domicil; it
depends upon no one fact or combination of
circumstances, but from the whole taken together
it must be determined in each particular case . . .
; and it may often occur, that the evidence of facts
tending to establish the domicil in one place,
would be entirely conclusive, were it not for the
existence of facts and circumstances of a still more
conclusive and decisive character, which fix it,
beyond question, in another.131
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court followed this
quotation with a discussion of the weight given each of the
factors and combinations of factors used in applying a subjective
standard.132 The Court held that the fact finder in a particular
dispute must determine the weight given to each factor or
combination of factors.133
In a more recent decision, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court reiterated the standard’s lack of guidance when
it stated, “[a]scertainment of the domicil [sic] of an individual is
mainly a question of fact to be determined from all the evidence
and circumstances.”134 That determination “depends upon no
one fact or combination of circumstances but upon all the factors
disclosed in the particular case.”135
These decisions leave taxpayers and administrators with
no advance guidance with respect to the weight given to each
factor or combination of factors. This situation improves slightly
with application of the five factors of the NESTOA Cooperative
Agreement, but potential Massachusetts domiciled taxpayers
face we-know-it-when-we-see-it disputes with little or no
guidance at the time of tax return preparation.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8

Tax Collector of Lowell v. Hanchett, 134 N.E. 355, 357 (Mass. 1922).
Id.
Id.
Commonwealth v. Davis, 187 N.E. 33, 37 (Mass. 1933).
Id. at 50.
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Minnesota

Minnesota’s rules accurately summarize the analysis used
in most states: “No positive rule can be adopted with respect to
the evidence necessary to prove an intention to change a
domicile but such intention may be proved by acts and
declarations, and of the two forms of evidence, acts must be
given more weight than declarations.”136 Like Massachusetts,
Minnesota’s rules begin with the proposition that the analysis
involves an effort to discern subjective intent and no precise
definition will uniformly guide taxpayers and state taxing
authorities in their interpretations.137
The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed its domicile
factors and the relative weight given each factor in Mauer v.
Commissioner of Revenue.138 First, the Minnesota Supreme
Court rejected an approach that determined domicile by
counting factors; it then proceeded to count factors and found
that the taxpayer had established a Minnesota domicile. 139 The
taxpayer argued that three factors favored Minnesota domicile
and the remaining eleven factors favored domicile in no
particular state.140 The Commissioner argued that ten factors
favored Minnesota domicile and four favored domicile in no
particular state.141 In determining the taxpayer’s domicile, the
Minnesota Tax Court found that eight of the twenty-six factors
favored Minnesota domicile, six factors favored Florida domicile,
six provided no indication of domicile, and six did not apply. 142
The dissent felt the majority got lost in the twenty-six factor test,
while ignoring major events of the taxpayer’s life.143 When
commenting on the domicile test, the dissent said, “[t]axpayers
in Minnesota enter the domicile swamp at their own peril.”144 In
response to the dissent, the majority noted, “[w]e acknowledge
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

MINN. R. 8001.0300 subp. 2 (2019).
Id.
829 N.W.2d 59 (Minn. 2013).
Id. at 69–70.
Id. at 70.
Id.
Id.
Mauer, 829 N.W.2d at 78.
Id.
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that any inquiry about a taxpayer’s domicile will be an intensive
fact-specific inquiry and that the results of such fact-specific
inquiries may not always be as precise as we would hope. But
the factors do have merit and do provide guidance.”145
The dissent took issue with the twenty-six factor domicile
test by calling it “no test at all” and rejected the Commissioner’s
depiction of the current approach to domicile as “common
sense.”146 The dissent compared the Commissioner’s review of
the factors in Mauer to similar findings of the Commissioner in
other cases before the Minnesota Supreme Court.147 According
to the dissent, the Commissioner selectively minimizes
documentary declarations of domicile, such as the address on a
driver’s license.148 In Mauer, because the taxpayer had attained
a Florida driver’s license, the Commissioner disregarded the
documentary declaration.149 In other cases, the Commissioner
emphasized a failure to change a driver’s license address as
evidence of no change in domicile.150
Similarly, the
Commissioner dismissed Mauer’s Florida homestead status as
an easily met requirement.151 However, when the taxpayer did
not change his or her homestead status, the Commissioner had
previously treated that failure as evidence of no change in
domicile.152
The Minnesota Tax Court has labeled “posturing” factors
the items dismissed by the Commissioner and discussed above
in the Mauer dissent.153 In Page v. Commissioner, the Minnesota
Tax Court considered a taxpayer’s acts such as “sending change
of address cards to various credit card companies and other
creditors, closing their Minneapolis bank accounts, and relying
solely upon their Illinois bank accounts” as carrying little, if any,

145. Id. at 75.
146. Id. at 78.
147. Id.
148. Mauer, 829 N.W.2d at 78.
149. Id.
150. Id. (citing Syfco v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. 4624, 1987 WL 5138, at
*6 (Minn. T.C. Feb. 11, 1987)).
151. Id.
152. Id. (citing Page v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. 4011, 1986 WL 15695, at
*7 (Minn. T.C. Mar. 12, 1986)).
153. Page, 1986 WL 15695, at *9.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8
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weight in a domicile analysis.154 In Sanchez v. Commissioner,
the Minnesota Tax Court similarly dismissed out-of-state
driver’s licenses, checking account, credit cards, and voter
registration.155
In summary, it appears at times that the Commissioner
finds the “posturing” factors compelling when absent and less
than compelling when present.
The majority in Mauer
acknowledged such a potential for abuse:
[W]e acknowledge and agree with the dissent’s
desire to convey to both the Commissioner and the
tax court that they must strive to apply the
Department’s factors in a consistent and equitable
manner. For taxpayers to have trust and
confidence that Minnesota’s tax system is fairly
and equitably applied to all, it is vitally important
that taxpayers be able to understand the
Department’s factors and how those factors are
applied in any given situation. Such an
understanding is important so that taxpayers can
adjust their expectations, intentions, and actions
accordingly.156
3.

New York

Individuals facing potential New York residency audits
must also assess the domicile factors with a focus on the primary
factors described above in Part I(E)(3). Although a more
complete discussion of these primary factors occurs in a
discussion of the NESTOA Cooperative Agreement that follows,
one particular dispute highlights some of the eccentricity of the
courts in addressing these matters.
In re Blatt illustrates a court’s analysis of the domicile
factors and a court’s fixation on one element of a particular
domicile factor.157 The taxpayer moved from New York to Texas
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
No. 7910, 2008 WL 8679077, at *5 (Minn. T.C. Oct. 9, 2008).
Mauer v. Comm’r of Revenue, 829 N.W.2d 59, 76 n.2 (Minn. 2013).
DTA No. 826504 (N.Y.S. Div. Tax App., Feb. 2, 2017).
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for a new job.158 He initially maintained a residence in each
state, but over time committed to living in Texas.159 Subsequent
to the year at issue, the taxpayer returned to New York for a
new position.160 While he was living in Texas, he stopped paying
tax to New York as a resident.161 Among the various domicile
factors weighed by the court were the taxpayer’s “near and dear”
items.162 Although the taxpayer maintained a home in both New
York and Texas, he moved his beloved dog from New York to
Texas.163 The dog’s location compelled a finding of domicile in
Texas.164 Did Blatt offer compelling testimony or did the
administrative law judge love dogs?
4.

NESTOA Cooperative Agreement

In Part I(E)(3), this Article lists the five primary indicia of
domicile as follows:






Home. Size, use and relative value of dwelling
places.
Time. Relative time spent in each jurisdiction.
Near and Dear. Location of “near and dear”
items.
Business.
Location of principal business
involvement.
Family. Location of family connections.

Each factor has more than one question in its body, the
Agreement does not prioritize the factors or the questions within
each factor, and the Agreement continues to permit a review of
other indicia of domicile “where appropriate.”165 The NESTOA
Cooperative Agreement also describes some of the questions
auditors should investigate in their analyses of each factor.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8

Id. at ¶ 55.
Id. at ¶¶ 38, 40, 42, 55.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
In re Blatt, DTA No. 826504 at ¶ 22.
Id.
NESTOA Cooperative Agreement, supra note 123.
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However, these questions cannot encompass all the possible
nuances of an individual’s life in arriving at subjective intent to
establish a domicile in a particular jurisdiction. It takes little
imagination to expand and question the sufficiency of the
questions provided for each of the primary factors. For
illustrative purposes, consider the questions used to measure
the relative size, use, and market value of a dwelling place
owned by the taxpayer when that taxpayer owns more than one
home.
Should an auditor give less weight to the home factor when
the taxpayer’s family lives in another jurisdiction? Did the
taxpayer decorate the home with “near and dear” items, and how
does their value affect the relative value comparison? Should a
consideration of relative value involve an adjustment for cost of
living by location? If the taxpayer plans to downsize upon
retirement, should the auditor give less weight to the relative
size and value of the dwelling? How should an auditor assess
the relative size, use, and market value of a home where the
taxpayer cannot occupy the home due to a spousal separation
agreement? When a home in the claimed former residence
jurisdiction has a loss of market value below the principal of the
mortgage, should the auditor ignore the retention of the home?
In addition to the nuances that may affect the domicile analysis,
the taxpayer has the burden of proof in these disputes, and often
the level of proof exceeds that imposed in other tax matters.
B.

Burden and Standard of Proof

Litigants with the burden of proof have the responsibility
to put forth sufficient evidence to prevail on their claims.166 This
burden of proof entails both the burden of producing the
evidence and the burden of persuading the trier of fact.167 The
standard of proof refers to the amount of evidence required to
prove a legal claim or assertion.168 The U.S. Supreme Court has
held that a standard of proof serves to “instruct the factfinder
166. John T. McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function
of a Burden of Persuasion, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1382 (1955).
167. Id. at 1382–83.
168. Standard of Proof, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should
have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular
type of adjudication.”169
Ordinarily, courts apply a
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in civil
claims.170 In some instances, civil cases apply a higher standard
referred to as the clear and convincing standard.171
When the standard of proof for the particular matter
requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the party with
the burden of proof must establish the facts to be more probably
true than false.172 The clear and convincing standard requires
that the “truth of the facts asserted should be strong.”173 The
party with the burden of proof “must establish that the facts,
which he asserts, are highly probably true.”174
1.

Massachusetts

In Massachusetts, the burden of proof in tax matters
generally rests with taxpayers.175 However, Massachusetts
places the burden of proof on the party asserting that a change
of domicile has occurred.176 The practical implications are that
taxpayers leaving the state have the burden of proving a change
of domicile and the Massachusetts Department of Revenue has
the burden of proof with respect to taxpayers entering the state.
Typically, in the absence of a statutory mandate, Massachusetts
taxpayers face a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof

169. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
170. J. P. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CAL. L. REV.
242, 245 (1944).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 247.
173. Id. at 253.
174. Id. at 254.
175. See Towle v. Comm’r of Revenue, 492 N.E.2d 739, 741–42 (Mass.
1986) (referring to use tax on boat); William Rodman & Sons, Inc. v. State Tax
Comm’n., 368 N.E.2d 1382, 1385 (Mass. 1977) (referring to excise tax on
cigarettes); Staples v. Comm’r of Corps. & Taxation., 24 N.E.2d 641, 643–44
(Mass. 1940) (referring to income tax on annuity income).
176. Horvitz v. Comm’r of Revenue, 747 N.E.2d 177 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001)
(noting that the Commissioner in this case had both the burden of production
and the burden of persuasion since the Commissioner was asserting a change
of domicile).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8
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in tax matters before the Appellate Tax Board.177
2.

Minnesota

Minnesota also believes that the burden of proof falls on
the party asserting that a change of domicile has taken place. 178
Minnesota applies a preponderance of the evidence standard of
proof.179 Therefore, like in Massachusetts and New York, the
practical implications are that taxpayers leaving the state have
the burden of proving a change of domicile and the Minnesota
Department of Taxation has the burden of proof with respect to
taxpayers entering the state.
3.

New York

New York law provides that the burden of proving a change
of domicile rests with the party asserting the change. 180
Therefore, like in Massachusetts, the practical implications are
that taxpayers leaving the state have the burden of proving a
change of domicile and the New York Department of Taxation
has the burden of proof with respect to taxpayers entering the
state. The difference between Massachusetts and New York is
the standard applied. Massachusetts applies a preponderance
of the evidence standard, and New York applies a clear and
convincing standard.181
Therefore, New York taxpayers
asserting a domicile change must meet the burden of proof and
the higher standard of proof.

177. See, e.g., Bayer Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue, Nos. F239697, F239698,
& F245722, 2005 WL 2179233 (Mass. App. Tax Bd., Sept. 8, 2005).
178. In re Smith’s Estate, 64 N.W.2d 129, 131 (Minn. 1954); McCutchan
v. Comm’r of Taxation, Docket No. 563 (Minn. Tax Ct. Jan. 20, 1956).
179. Red Owl Stores, Inc. v. Comm’r of Taxation, 117 N.W.2d 401, 407
(Minn. 1962).
180. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 105.20(d)(2) (McKinney 2019); see generally
Bodfish v. Gallman, 378 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1976).
181. Ruderman v. Ruderman, 82 N.Y.S.2d 479, 481 (1948).
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Domicile or Residency Bias

Taxpayers can find domicile or residency bias in
administrative guidance issued by the states and in their
respective court decisions.
This bias may generate a
disproportionate number of audits of taxpayers with proposed
no-tax residency states and finds its way into the court decisions
and arguments put forth by the commissioners of revenue.
Minnesota and New York have not hidden that bias well.
The above discussion of Minnesota’s domicile factors
argues that the Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue finds the
“posturing” factors compelling when absent and less than
compelling when present.182 If pushed, the Commissioner of
Revenue would likely argue that these positions reflect zealous
advocacy rather than bias and other facts supported a domicile
and residency conclusion. However, the Mauer dissent made a
compelling argument that the Commissioner of Revenue has
made selective use of the “posturing” domicile factors.183
Minnesota has also wrestled with the role of tax avoidance
in domicile determinations. The Minnesota Supreme Court has
stated, “[i]t is to be pointed out that if the necessary intention to
change one’s domicile is, in fact, present, the motive or purpose
in making the change [e.g., tax avoidance] is unimportant.” 184
However, one commentator has suggested that the actions of
Minnesota courts do not always follow this mandate.185 In
furtherance of his belief that tax avoidance is considered, this
commentator goes further and suggests proposed residency
states with no income tax are disproportionately at issue in
domicile disputes before Minnesota courts.186 “Minnesota is
often referred to among friends as ‘the Hotel California: You can
check out any time you like, but you can never leave.’”187
182. See infra Part II(A)(2).
183. Mauer v. Comm’r of Revenue, 829 N.W.2d 59, 78 (Minn. 2013).
184. Miller v. Comm’r of Taxation, 59 N.W.2d 925, 926 n.2 (Minn. 1953)
(internal citations omitted).
185. Joseph E. Cooch, When Everything Matters, Nothing Matters:
Minnesota’s Unprincipled Approach for Determining Domicile in Tax Disputes,
and a Path Forward, 37 HAMLINE L. REV. 229, 247 (2014).
186. Id.
187. Dale Kurschner, The Great Migration, TWIN CITIES BUS., at 41, (Apr.
2016), http://pageturnpro2.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/Publicat

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8
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The New York Nonresident Audit Guidelines direct the
department’s auditors to pay special attention to taxpayers who
recognize large capital gains immediately after a reported
change of domicile. “Large capital gains are uncommon, and
often the only change in lifestyle demonstrated by the individual
is the fact that a substantial gain was realized in the year of, or
immediately after, the alleged change of domicile.”188 This
language in the New York Nonresident Audit Guidelines
demonstrates a residency bias by implying that taxpayers assert
domicile change to avoid tax following a large capital gain.
Despite the Department’s assertion that individuals assert
domicile change to avoid tax, on many occasions the link
between the capital gain and the domicile change could be a
mere change in employment status or other life event. Indeed,
that large capital gain could be the sale of stock in a business
following an individual’s retirement.
The Guidelines miss the mark in at least one other respect.
Although courts must review a taxpayer’s intentions to change
her domicile, an intention to avoid tax should not affect that
taxpayer’s status as a domiciliary. At least in New York, the
courts have long recognized the right of a taxpayer to “change
his or her domicile for the purpose of avoiding taxation.”189 In
Ingle v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, the Court considered
the state income tax consequences of domicile abandonment in a
review of a taxpayer’s subjective intent to change her domicile. 190
Where a New York domiciliary relocated to Tennessee during
the year, a dispute existed about the timing of her change
in domicile.191 The taxpayer’s employer sold the business in
which the taxpayer owned stock.192 Aware that she would
realize a large capital gain on her stock and owe considerable
New York income tax, the taxpayer hastened her move back to
Tennessee.193 The Court found that the taxpayer’s tax avoidance
ions/201603/1688/71391/PDF/131032230076236000_TCB0416.pdf.
188. State of N.Y. Dep’t of Tax’n and Fin., supra note 33 at 84.
189. Andrews v. Graves, 32 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1942), aff’d, 42 N.E.2d 748
(N.Y. 1942).
190. 973 N.Y.S.2d 877 (2013).
191. Id. at 879–80.
192. Id. at 880.
193. Id.
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motive, among other matters, supported the conclusion that she
did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that
her domicile changed to Tennessee prior to the stock sale.194
New York defines domicile as “the place which an
individual intends to be such individual’s permanent home - the
place to which such individual intends to return whenever such
individual may be absent.”195 Minnesota defines domicile as
“that place in which that person’s habitation is fixed, without
any present intentions of removal therefrom, and to which,
whenever absent, that person intends to return.”196
An
individual’s motivation, pure or riddled with tax avoidance,
appears in neither state’s definition of domicile. This bias has
infected Minnesota and New York’s judicial determinations.
Adopting a new standard for residency, such as that used in
federal income tax, may remove this bias and lead to equitable
results for taxpayers and states.
III. Following the Feds
Under current law and similar to state personal income tax
laws, the Internal Revenue Code imposes tax on the worldwide
income of resident aliens and U.S. citizens.197 However, the
Internal Revenue Code imposes tax on nonresident aliens only
to the extent their income flows from U.S. sources or constitutes
income effectively connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or
business.198 Therefore, similar to state personal income tax
laws, residency status results in a broad base for taxation.
As described below, Congress arrived at the current
statutes controlling the taxation of aliens after a journey
through the uncertainty that existed under prior law. A history
of the evolution of federal income taxation in this area may
enlighten states in their consideration of residency status for tax
purposes.

194. Id. at 880–81 (referring to a vehicle registration and registration to
vote in Tennessee done to escape taxation).
195. N.Y. TAX LAW, § 105.20(d)(1) (McKinney 2019).
196. MINN.. R. 8001.0300 subp. 2 (2019).
197. I.R.C. § 1 (2017).
198. See I.R.C. § 2(d) (2005); § 871 (2018).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8
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Defining a Resident―The First 70 Years

Prior to 1984, the Internal Revenue Code did not define the
terms “resident alien” or “nonresident alien.”199 Instead,
taxpayers relied on Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings
for guidance. Treasury Regulations generally determined
residency based on an alien’s intentions and the length and
nature of his or her stay.200
An alien actually present in the United States
who is not a mere transient or sojourner is a
resident of the United States for purposes of the
income tax.
Whether he is a transient is
determined by his intentions with regard to the
length and nature of his stay. A mere floating
intention, indefinite as to time, to return to
another country is not sufficient to constitute him
a transient. If he lives in the United States and
has no definite intention as to his stay, he is a
resident. One who comes to the United States for
a definite purpose which in its nature may be
promptly accomplished is a transient; but, if his
purpose is of such a nature that an extended stay
may be necessary for its accomplishment, and to
that end the alien makes his home temporarily in
the United States, he becomes a resident, though
it may be his intention at all times to return to his
domicile abroad when the purpose for which he
came has been consummated or abandoned. An
alien whose stay in the United States is limited to
a definite period by the immigration laws is not a
resident of the United States within the meaning
of this section, in the absence of exceptional
circumstances.201

199. Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2 (1957).
200. Id.
201. Id.
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Unfortunately, in an attempt to define resident alien, the
regulation quoted above used other undefined terms that needed
definition.202 The regulation lacked definitions of transient,
sojourner, and floating intention.203 These undefined terms
provided little additional guidance because the factors used to
define resident alien also lacked a precise definition.
Unfortunately, the Regulations further confused taxpayers by
creating a set of rebuttable presumptions concerning the length
and nature of the alien’s stay in the United States.204
With the exception of one revenue ruling, the rulings
provided little guidance because they addressed narrow fact
patterns and questions. Revenue Ruling 69-611, one of the few
rulings of general application, offered some guidance on the
issue of residence.205
Revenue Ruling 69-611 raised a
presumption of residence if an alien remained within the United
States for one full year. Taxpayers could rebut this presumption
with proof they did not intend to remain in the country and came
to the U.S. as mere visitors.206
B.

Reason for the Federal Law Change

Congress believed that the tax law should provide a more
objective definition of residence for income tax purposes.207 The
enactment of Section 7701(b) reflected Congressional intent,
through an objective definition of residence, to facilitate tax
planning, return preparation, and enforcement.208 Congress
understood that an objective definition might allow some aliens
otherwise taxable as residents to avoid resident status, and
would impose resident status on some aliens that did not meet
the definition of residents under the current rules.209 On
balance, however, Congress found that the certainty provided by

468.

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

§ 1.871-2(b).
Id.
Id.
Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 98-432, at 1523 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.

208. Id.
209. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8
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the new objective definition outweighed other considerations
and adopted a regime that depended on length of stay.210
C.

Section 7701(b) Arrives

In its switch to an objective definition of resident, Congress
incorporated its new definition in Section 7701(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code. Section 7701(b) begins with the proposition that
aliens (not U.S. citizens) pay tax as nonresident aliens unless
they meet one of two tests. Aliens meeting either the “green card
test” or the “substantial presence test” for the calendar year face
taxation of their worldwide income similar to the taxation of
residents for state personal income tax purposes.211
A taxpayer meets the “green card test” if the individual has (1)
attained the privilege of residing permanently in the United
States under the immigration laws; and (2) the government has
not revoked that status.212 A taxpayer meets the “substantial
presence test” if the individual has physical presence in the
United States on at least: (1) thirty-one days during the current
year, and (2) 183 days during the three-year period that includes
the current year and the two years immediately before that,
including: (a) All the days you were present in the current year,
(b) 1/3 of the days you were present in the first year before the
current year, and (c) 1/6 of the days you were present in the
second year before the current year.213
This “substantial presence test” effectively captures and
taxes the worldwide income of individuals that have spent 183
days in the United States in the current taxable year. This test
also captures those individuals spending 183 days in the United
States over a three-year period, but accords less weight to the
preceding years in arriving at the total days. This extended test
prevents taxpayers from stringing together nearly a full year of
U.S. presence without taxation as a resident. For example, in
the absence of this extended period test, an individual could
couple a stay of 182 days in one year with another 182 days
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A) (2018).
§§ 7701(b)(1)(A)(i), 7701(b)(6) (2018).
§ 7701(b)(3)(A) (2018).
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immediately following in the succeeding year without taxation
as a resident.
D.

State Adoption of an Equivalent Presence Test
1.

Massachusetts

Until 1995, Massachusetts defined a resident solely as an
individual domiciled in the state. The legislature adopted
provisions similar to Section 7701(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code when it enacted Chapter 38 of the Acts of 1995 modifying
the definition of “resident” to add the permanent place of abode
and 183 days of presence test to the domicile standard (without
the extended period of Section 7701(b)).214 Instead of following
Congress’s replacement of the domicile standard, Massachusetts
expanded its residency definition by adding an alternative way
to treat individuals as residents.
2.

Minnesota

Minnesota’s residency rules have remained largely
unchanged since enactment of its personal income tax in 1933
(and the Minnesota Department of Revenue’s adoption of the
twenty-six factor test in 1982).215 However, in 1987, Minnesota
adopted the permanent place of abode and 183 days of
“substantial presence test.”216 Like Massachusetts, Minnesota
expanded its residency definition by adding an alternative way
to treat individuals as residents.
3.

New York

Unlike, Massachusetts and Minnesota, New York adopted
its “presence test” prior to enactment of Section 7701(b) of the

214. See TIR 95-7: Change in the Definition of “Resident” for
Massachusetts Income Tax Purposes, MASS.GOV (Jan. 10, 1996),
https://www.mass.gov/technical-information-release/tir-95-7-change-in-the-de
finition-of-resident-for-massachusetts.
215. See MINN. R. 8001.0300(2) (2019).
216. 1987 MINN. LAWS 1044.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8
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Internal Revenue Code.217 In 1922, the New York State
Legislature enacted a statutory definition of a resident for
income tax purposes that included a person “who maintains a
permanent place of abode within the state, and spends in the
aggregate more than seven months of the taxable year within
the state.”218 The tax department supported the new law as “an
alternative to the highly subjective common law test of domicile,
which had governed residency determinations until that
point.”219 In 1954, the Legislature amended the seven-month
test for presence in New York and replaced it with the 183-day
rule.220 In explaining the justification for the proposed change,
the department’s memorandum in support noted that there had
been many cases of tax avoidance, even evasion, and that
“persons who really are residents nevertheless manage to
comply with the present seven-month rule by spending long
weekends, holidays and vacations outside the state.”221
IV. Tax Policy
The domicile standards enacted by the states fail the test
of fundamental principles of tax policy. An adoption of an
objective standard can move states toward better tax policy.
A.

Fundamental Principles of a Sound Tax System

Adam Smith set forth four maxims applicable to taxes in
general: (1) taxes should be proportional to taxpayers’ abilities
to pay, (2) the tax due should be certain and not arbitrary, (3)
217. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 350(7) (1987) (repealed 1987).
218. See id.
219. Timothy P. Noonan & Joshua K. Lawrence, The Goods on Gaied:
What It Means, From the Front Lines, Noonan’s NOTES BLOG 409, 409 n.4 (May
19, 2014), https://www.hodgsonruss.com/media/publication/44_The%20Goods
%20on%20Gaied%20-%20What%20It%20Means,%20From%20the%20Front%
20Lines%205%2019%2014.pdf. (stating “the tax law had previously defined
the term ‘resident’ as ‘any person who shall, at any time during the last six
months of the calendar year, be a resident of the state.’ But it did not define
what constituted being a resident during that period”).
220. Id. at 410 (citing Mem. of Dept. of Taxation & Finance, 1954 N.Y.
LEGIS. ANN., at 296).
221. Id.
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the tax should be levied at a convenient time, and (4) the tax
should be administered in the most economical way possible. 222
Similar to the tax policy principles in The Wealth of Nations, the
states have developed and published their own tax policy
principles.223
In 2010, The National Conference of State Legislatures
released a handbook that addressed tax policy principles that
states should consider when imposing a personal income tax.224
The handbook concludes that states should review the
reliability, equity, compliance and administration, interstate
and international competition, economic neutrality, and
accountability of their personal income tax laws.225 Of these
principles, domicile presents the greatest challenge to
compliance and administration. Although this document does
not address residency or domicile in its discussion, the handbook
does discuss the need to reduce compliance costs for taxpayers
and limit the amount of required record maintenance.226
In 2013, the Massachusetts Legislature established the
Tax Fairness Commission.227 The Massachusetts Legislature
charged the Commission with analyzing Massachusetts tax laws
and the equity of current tax policies.228 Although The Report of
the Tax Fairness Commission in Massachusetts did not directly
address domicile or residency, it provided guidance with respect
to the fundamental principles of a sound tax system.229 It
determined, among other things, that a tax should “be as simple,
administratively efficient, and cost-effective as possible; and . . .
be as predictable as possible.”230

222. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 639–41 (1776).
223. Id.
224. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TAX POLICY HANDBOOK FOR
STATE LEGISLATORS (2010), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/TaxPolicyHa
ndbook3rdEdition.pdf.
225. Id. at 4.
226. See id. at 5.
227. COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., REP. OF TAX FAIRNESS COMM’N 1 (2014),
https://itep.org/wp-content/uploads/TaxFairnessCommissionReport.pdf.
228. Id. at 1.
229. Id. at 7.
230. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/8
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In 2015, the Minnesota Department of Revenue delivered
a report to the Minnesota Legislature on its personal income tax
laws governing residency and domicile.231 The report outlined
various policy goals for the residency and domicile laws in
Minnesota:




Help ensure consistent, transparent, and fair
treatment of all taxpayers
Make it easier for taxpayers to understand
how residency is determined for taxes
Reduce the time and effort needed for
taxpayers who are selected for a residency
audit232

Governor Andrew Cuomo established the New York State
Tax Reform and Fairness Commission in December 2012 to
conduct a comprehensive and objective review of the State’s tax
structure, including its corporate, sales, estate and personal
income taxes.233 The Governor charged the commission with
developing revenue-neutral policy options to modernize the
current tax system with the goals of increasing its simplicity,
fairness, economic competitiveness and affordability.234
B.

Application of Tax Policy Principles to Domicile
Determinations

Combining the concepts discussed by Adam Smith and the
state tax commissions discussed above, this Part addresses
certainty, and cost-effectiveness in the administration of the
domicile law as a test for residency.

231. MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 38, at 1.
232. Id. at 10.
233. N.Y. STATE TAX REFORM AND FAIRNESS COMM’N, FINAL REP., (2013),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/archive/assets/docum
ents/greenislandandreportandappendicies.pdf.
234. Id. at 3.

47

ARTICLE 8_THOMAS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

922

PACE LAW REVIEW
1.

8/23/2019 6:45 PM

Vol. 39.2

Certainty

Adam Smith argued that “[t]he tax which each individual
is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary.”235 He
argued the following:
The uncertainty of taxation encourages the
insolence and favours the corruption of an order of
men who are naturally unpopular, even where
they are neither insolent nor corrupt. The
certainty of what each individual ought to pay is,
in taxation, a matter of so great importance that
a very considerable degree of inequality, it
appears, I believe, from the experience of all
nations, is not near so great an evil as a very small
degree of uncertainty.236
The domicile rules of many states begin with the
proposition that the analysis involves an effort to discern
subjective intent and no precise definition will uniformly guide
taxpayers
and
state
taxing
authorities
in
their
interpretations.237 Such a rocky start dooms states to problems
with certainty. When the determination of domicile or the exact
date that domicile begins or ends is murky, taxpayers lose
respect for the taxing authorities and the system itself.
Even if we were to assume that taxpayers could navigate
the domicile definition, identifying the precise day that the
change in domicile occurs creates its own problems. Consider
the recent wealthy retiree that wishes to move to Florida: The
retiree purchases a new home in Florida on January 3rd, makes
some minor renovations on January 14th, lists her home in the
old domicile for sale on February 2nd, purchases new furniture
for the Florida home on March 4th, begins to live in the Florida
home on March 15th, moves some additional furniture to Florida
on April 1st, signs a contract for sale of the home in the old
domicile on April 15th, and closes the sale of the former
235. SMITH, supra note 222, at 639.
236. Id.
237. See, e.g., MINN. R. 8001.0300 subp. 2 (2019).
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residence on June 1st. During this same tax year, retiree’s
spouse moves to the new Florida home on April 10th, but both
retiree and her spouse spend time in both locations until June
1st. This fact pattern clearly demonstrates an intent to change
domicile, but when did it occur? A review of the domicile factors
in Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New York provide little
guidance in our efforts to pinpoint the exact date that the
taxpayers’ acts create sufficient evidence to prove a domicile
change. Instead, practitioners and taxpayers make their best
guess and collect support for their choices. If challenged, the
taxpayer has the burden of proving the domicile change date in
a system of uncertainty.
In Minnesota, taxpayer uncertainty became so uncertain
that the Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue listed fourteen
myths permeating the taxpayer community with respect to
domicile and residency in that state.238 These myths permeated
the taxpayer community with respect to the Department of
Revenue’s analysis of domicile and residency.239 The myths
generally reflected taxpayer difficulty with the twenty-six factor
domicile test described in Part II(D) of this Article and fell into
various categories. Consistent across several of the identified
myths, many taxpayers believed that the existence of one
domicile factor doomed them to residency status.240 One myth
related to an outdated factor used in the residency
determination: the location of a bank account in the state. 241
Responding to this myth, the Department of Revenue stated that
no one factor is determinative and conceded that the use of this
particular factor has less relevance due to the modernization of
the banking industry.242 Another myth reflects a paranoia
running through the tax community: “Revenue will track where
my pets are by the microchips that are implanted and use that
against me if the microchip is registered in Minnesota.”243
Subsequent to the issuance of the Minnesota Residency
Report, the legislature amended the statutes to address many of
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 38, at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id.
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these myths and prohibit the consideration of various matters in
the determination of an individual’s domicile.244 Despite these
myths and other definitional difficulties in Minnesota, the State
proposed changes to its domicile factors rather than an
elimination or substantial modification to the definition of
resident.
2.

Economical Administration

It has been said that “[e]very tax ought to be so contrived
as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people
as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public
treasury of the state.”245 Smith interpreted this last maxim to
mean that a tax (1) should be capable of economical
administration, (2) should not “obstruct the industry of the
people,” (3) should not offer undue opportunities for evasion, and
(4) should not impose “unnecessary trouble, vexation, and
oppression” upon the public.246 As described, infra, the ordinary
domicile audit includes a substantial invasion of privacy,
considerable document production efforts, and may continue for
months or more than a year. Eliminating the subjective
component and moving to a physical presence test would
accelerate the pace of the audits rather than create the
“unnecessary trouble, vexation, and oppression” in its current
form.
Some tax professionals refer to residency audits as “tax
colonoscopies.”247 This procedure ordinarily begins with the
mailing of a domicile questionnaire to a targeted taxpayer. 248
The Minnesota Residency Report describes its audit process as
follows:


Auditor Notifies Taxpayer of Audit, Requests
Information

244. MINN. STAT. § 290.01 subdiv. 7(c) (2018).
245. SMITH, supra note 222, at 640.
246. Id.
247. Residency Audits: The Curse of Second Homes, WESTVIEW INV.
ADVISORS, http://www.westviewinvest.com/blog/residency-audits-curse-second
-homes (last visited Feb. 6, 2019).
248. MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 38, at 17.
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Taxpayer Gathers Information
Taxpayer Submits Information
Auditor Reviews Information
Auditor Requests More Information
Taxpayer Gathers and Submits Additional
Information
Auditor Reviews Additional Information,
Prepares Report
Auditor
Presents
Audit
Report
to
249
Taxpayer/Representative

On its face, the process seems logical and measured;
however, revisiting the information requested and its need may
lead to a different conclusion. As a starting point, gathering the
information and reviewing the information takes time. The
Minnesota Residency Report grants taxpayers thirty days to
respond to the initial request and suggests that its auditors
review that information over the next thirty days.250 Because
the rules seek information on twenty-six domicile factors, it
requires little imagination to understand the depth and extent
of the inquiry.251 Compare this examination to taxpayers facing
an audit on the “substantial presence test” who merely address
their days spent in the state and whether they have a permanent
place of abode in the state.252 If Minnesota truly wanted to
“reduce the time and effort needed for taxpayers who are
selected for a residency audit,”253 it need only remove the
domicile test and rely entirely on the presence test.
Privacy suffers as auditors raise questions concerning
family relationships, personal relationships, business
relationships, travel habits, spending habits, and other personal
matters.
In a recent audit of this author’s client, the
Massachusetts Department of Revenue requested and received
information concerning a taxpayer’s marital relationship, child
visitation privileges, religious worship habits, parental
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id.
MINN. R. 8001.0300 subp. 3 (2019).
MINN. STAT. § 290.01 subdiv. 7(b) (2018).
MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 38, at 10.
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relationships, vacation preferences, hobbies, movie preferences,
credit card spending, and gambling abilities.
In a California case that truly goes beyond normal behavior
for both the taxpayer and the Government, Gilbert Hyatt spent
more than twenty years in various courts fighting a residency
determination where he produced 220 declarations, affidavits
from more than 150 witnesses, and thousands of pages of
contemporaneous documentary evidence.254
In turn, the
Franchise Tax Board sent more than 100 letters and information
demands to third parties, including Hyatt’s banks, utility
companies, newspapers, medical providers, attorneys, and
business associates. In addition, the Franchise Tax Board
conducted interviews and collected signed statements from
various individuals estranged from Hyatt at the time.255
Bill Leonard, a member of the California State Board of
Equalization and a twenty-four year member of the California
Legislature, provided the following critique of the Franchise Tax
Board’s conduct:
. . . the FTB investigators crossed many ethical
lines and demonstrated how tax agents are not
held to the same legal standards we demand of
law enforcement officers. Tax agents rummaged
through his trash without warrants, visited
business partners and doctors, and shared his
Social Security Number and other personal
information with the media. This is outrageous
behavior and I call on the FTB to rein in their
agents. What really galled me is the FTB testified
in open court that this level of harassment was
only a typical audit. If true, then the storm
troopers are alive and well at the FTB.256

254. Hearing Summary, Franchise and Income Tax Appeal at 6, In re
Appeal of Gilbert P. Hyatt, Case No. 435770 (1991).
255. Id. at 6–7.
256. David Nolte, California Loses Big in Litigation Involving Its Tax
Jurisdiction and Related Residency Audits, HG.ORG LEGAL RES.,
https://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=5410 (last visited Feb. 6, 2019).
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Conclusion
As the states developed their presence laws, many initially
adopted those laws to supplement, rather than replace, the facts
and circumstances domicile test of residence. The historic
definition of residence as domicile was already on the books and
deeply embedded in practice and case law.257 The dual definition
of residence for state income tax purposes gave the states two
“bites at the apple” to classify an individual as a resident and
subject the taxpayer to state taxation on her worldwide income.
Despite the historic application of the domicile test and the
revenue raising potential, states should abandon the domicile
concept in favor of an objective standard consistent with tax
policy maxims.
This would increase cost-effective
implementation of state law and provide taxpayers and auditors
with certainty in tax return preparation and examinations.
In 1984, Congress showed us the way in its move from the
federal “subjective test” to a “substantial presence test”258
comparable to the states’ presence tests. States with both the
domicile and presence test may object to the elimination of the
domicile test and the potential loss of revenue. However, those
states could address such concerns by adjusting the residency
test to meet revenue targets. This adjustment could include
such changes as removing the permanent place of abode
requirement or altering the number of days required for
residency.
Grateful taxpayers may applaud a test that relies heavily
on a mere count of days in a state and avoids invasive, timeconsuming inquiries into their personal lives. Ultimately, a
move away from the domicile standard would help ensure
consistent, transparent, and fair treatment of all taxpayers and
restore confidence in our tax system.

257. See Tamagni v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 695 N.E.2d 1125, 1128 (N.Y.
1998).
258. See supra Part III.
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